JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff appeals from the July 12, 2011 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert P. Patterson, Judge) dismissing this qui tam action and disqualifying plaintiff, its individual members — including a former general counsel to defendant — and its outside counsel from bringing a subsequent qui tam action on the basis that the suit was brought in violation of the general counsel's ethical obligations under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the "N.Y. Rules").1 The issues on appeal arise out of the tension between an attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality and the federal interest in encouraging "whistleblowers" to disclose unlawful conduct harmful to the government.

We consider here two questions: (1) whether the District Court correctly held that the former general counsel to defendant violated his ethical obligations under the N.Y. Rules by participating in this qui tam action; and, if so, (2) whether the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint and disqualifying plaintiff, all of its general partners including the former general counsel, and its outside counsel from bringing any subsequent qui tam action based on similar facts.

We agree that the attorney in question, through his conduct in this qui tam action, violated N.Y. Rule 1.9(c) which, in relevant part, prohibits lawyers from "us[ing] confidential information of [a] former client protected by Rule 1.6 to the disadvantage of the former client," N.Y. Rule 1.9(c), except "to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a crime," id. 1.6(b)(2).

In addition, we hold that the District Court did not err by dismissing the complaint as to all defendants, and disqualifying plaintiff, its individual relators, and its outside counsel on the basis that such measures were necessary to avoid prejudicing defendants in any subsequent litigation on these facts.

Accordingly, we affirm the July 12, 2011 judgment of the District Court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-appellant Fair Laboratory Practices Associates ("FLPA" or "plaintiff") brought this qui tam action2 pursuant to the federal False Claims Act ("FCA")3, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, against defendants-appellees Quest Diagnostics Incorporated ("Quest") and Unilab Corporation ("Unilab")4 for alleged violations of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b ("AKS").5 One of FLPA's general partners, Mark Bibi, was formerly General Counsel to defendant Unilab. The facts set forth below are drawn from the record on appeal, including the account of facts found by the District Court.

A. The Parties

Quest is a Delaware corporation founded in 1996 and headquartered in New Jersey that provides diagnostic medical testing services for managed care organizations ("MCOs")6 and independent practice associations ("IPAs")7 nationwide. In 2003, Quest acquired Unilab — a clinical laboratory company headquartered in California — through a "cash tender offer." Unilab became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Quest through a subsequent merger.

FLPA, the "relator" in this qui tam action, is a Delaware general partnership formed in 2005 by three former Unilab executives, Andrew Baker ("Baker"), Richard Michaelson ("Michaelson"), and Mark Bibi ("Bibi" and jointly, the "individual relators") for the purpose of bringing this qui tam action. The individual relators worked for Unilab prior to its acquisition by Quest in 2003. Baker was Unilab's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer from 1993 to about December 1996. Michaelson was Unilab's Chief Financial Officer from 1993 to January 1998, and was a director of and consultant to Unilab from January 1998 to November 1999. Bibi was Unilab's Vice President, Executive Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel from November 1993 to March 2000, and then served only as an Executive Vice President through June 2000, after which he was retained as a consultant by Unilab until December 2000.

Bibi's role as Unilab's General Counsel is central to the issues presented on appeal. Bibi, who has been practicing law in New York since 1985, was Unilab's sole "in-house" lawyer from 1993-2000. In that capacity, he was responsible for all of Unilab's legal and compliance affairs, such as advising Unilab on matters relating to its MCO contracts and managing all litigation against the company.

B. The Alleged Scheme

FLPA alleges that "[f]rom at least 1996 through at least 2005, Unilab and Quest violated the AKS8 by operating a `pull-through' scheme by which they charged MCOs and IPAs commercially unreasonable discounted prices [on non-federal business] to induce referrals of Medicare and Medicaid business and then billed the Medicare and Medicaid business to the Government at dramatically higher prices than those charged to the MCOs and IPAs [on the nonfederal business]." Appellant's Br. 6 (citing Complaint ¶¶ 43-52). Specifically, FLPA argues that the "commercially unreasonable discounted prices" constituted "kickback[s], bribe[s] or rebate[s]" insofar as they were designed to induce referrals of Medicare and Medicaid business. Appellant's Br. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Between 1993 and 1996, the individual relators began to question whether Unilab's pricing structure violated the AKS. For example, as Chief Financial Officer, Michaelson allegedly knew that Unilab often charged its MCO clients prices that were sometimes less than 50% of Unilab's actual testing costs. And Bibi allegedly advised Baker that Unilab's pricing structure, as it was then formulated, potentially facilitated "kickbacks."

In response to these concerns about Unilab's pricing structure, "Unilab, under its then-CEO [Baker], established a new pricing policy ... that included negotiated increases to the rates under its existing contracts." Joint App'x 213. Specifically, in 1996 Unilab delivered a letter to its MCO and physician-association customers "stating that it was reserving its contractual right to terminate its contract with that customer and would, in thirty days, cease providing laboratory services to any customer that did not agree to a price increase." Id. Following Unilab's notice that it was raising its prices, some of Unilab's "customers began to slowly slip away to [its] competitors." Id. at 214.

FLPA asserts that Baker's tenure as CEO ended in 1997 as a result of the falling profits caused by this increase in Unilab's prices. When Baker left, Unilab's shares were selling for less than $3 per share. In 1999, Kelso & Co. completed a leveraged buy-out of Unilab for $5.85 per share and installed a new management team, including Robert Whalen as CEO. Whalen reversed course from Baker's pricing policy, informing other executives that "Baker's increased pricing had been a mistake, and that Unilab needed to (i) accept commercially unreasonable contracts with MCOs and physician associations and (ii) implement a strategy that required physicians to refer, and the MCOs to arrange for or recommend that physicians refer, fee-for-service business, including Medicare and Medicaid-reimbursable business, to Unilab." Id. at 215-16.

In December 1999, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General ("OIG") published Advisory Opinion ("AO") 99-13, which addressed the pricing practices of clinical pathologists. In particular, AO 99-13 indicated that if the prices offered to MCOs on non-federal business were below "actual cost," such an arrangement "might" violate the AKS because the OIG would infer that such discounts were offered for the purpose of inducing physicians to refer their Medicare and Medicaid business.

The month after AO 99-13 was published, Bibi had a meeting with Whalen during which Bibi stated his "personal opinion," that AO 99-13 created an inference of illegality with respect to Unilab's existing pricing structure. Whalen allegedly instructed Bibi to work with outside counsel to "find a way around" AO 99-13. In response Bibi obtained an opinion letter from an outside law firm, Winston & Strawn, on this issue.9 Bibi never reported his concerns to the Unilab Board.

FLPA alleges that Bibi was subsequently "frozen out" by Unilab's management as a result of his concerns related to Unilab's pricing structure and was no longer asked for advice on compliance matters. By March 2000, Bibi had been replaced as General Counsel.

After the individual relators left Unilab, the company allegedly "continued its illegal pull-through strategy and as a result significantly improved its profitability." Id. at 216. In 2003, Quest acquired Unilab at a price of $26.50 per share. According to Bibi, Baker — who had sold his remaining Unilab shares for $5.85 per share three years earlier — felt "shortchanged." Baker contacted Jeffrey Lanzolatta, a longtime Unilab executive, who allegedly told Baker that Unilab "had become very profitable engaging in the pull-through practice." Id. at 918. Baker relayed this information to Bibi, stating that he was in a tax dispute with Unilab/Quest and "wanted to go after them.... [t]hrough a qui tam lawsuit." Id.

C. Procedural History

Baker initiated the filing of this qui tam action and invited Michaelson and Bibi to join him as individual relators; in particular, he believed Bibi's status as a lawyer "would improve our credibility with the government." Id. at 920. Recognizing the potential ethical implications of a former general counsel bringing a qui tam lawsuit against his former company and client, Bibi consulted the N.Y. Rules and the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct to determine whether he could participate. Bibi concluded that certain exceptions to the attorney-client confidentiality rules permitted his participation, and "did not feel it was necessary" to verify his understanding with the New York state bar. Id. at 932.

On January 1, 2005, FLPA was formed for the purpose of acting as a relator in one or more qui tam actions against defendants for alleged violations of the AKS. Pursuant to the FLPA partnership agreement, Bibi stands to collect 29% of any qui tam recovery, while Baker and Michaelson would receive 57% and 14%, respectively. On June 7, 2005, FLPA filed this qui tam action in the Southern District of New York. After FLPA filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") on May 18, 2010,10 the District Court permitted defendants to take discovery regarding whether Bibi and FLPA had improperly used or disclosed Unilab's confidences in this lawsuit. Following the completion of this discovery, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that Bibi's participation in this qui tam action violated two provisions of the N.Y. Rules.

First, defendants argued that Bibi violated N.Y. Rule 1.9(a), known as the "side-switching" rule, which provides that

N.Y. Rule 1.9(a).11 Defendants asserted that, by acting as an individual relator in this qui tam action, Bibi essentially "switched sides" and represented the government against Unilab, his former client.

Second, defendants argued that Bibi violated the N.Y. Rules by making use of Unilab's confidential information for this litigation. Pursuant to N.Y. Rule 1.9(c),12

FLPA, in turn, relied upon the exception in N.Y. Rule 1.6(b), which permits a lawyer to "reveal or use confidential information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a crime...." N.Y. Rule 1.6(b)(2).14

On March 24, 2011, the District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, presumably pursuant to the "inherent power ... necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs," Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (discussing authority to dismiss sua sponte for failure to prosecute). See United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., No. 05 Civ. 5393(RPP), 2011 WL 1330542, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2011).15 The District Court concluded that the FCA did not preempt applicable state ethical rules, and that Bibi's participation in this action violated Rule 1.9(a) — the "side-switching rule" — and Rule 1.9(c)'s prohibition on disclosing client confidences beyond what was "necessary," within the meaning of Rule 1.6(b), to prevent the commission of a crime. Id. at *6-11.

In light of these conclusions, the District Court held that the appropriate remedy was to (1) dismiss the Complaint as to all defendants, and (2) disqualify FLPA, each of the individual relators, and FLPA's counsel from bringing this suit or any subsequent suit based on the same facts. Id. at *11-13. The District Court reasoned that these measures were "necessary to protect Defendants from the use of their confidential information against them." Id. at *13. The District Court clarified that the dismissal in no way affected the right of the United States to intervene and bring an action against defendants. Id. at *14. On July 5, 2011, however, the United States gave notice that it was declining to intervene. Judgment was entered on July 12, 2011.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, FLPA argues principally that (1) the District Court erred in holding that Bibi violated his ethical duties under the N.Y. Rules; and (2) the District Court erred in granting an overly broad remedy in favor of the defendants. We consider each argument in turn.

A. Bibi Violated N.Y. Rule 1.9(c) by Disclosing Unilab's Confidential Information

We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss a qui tam action de novo. United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing a district court's order dismissing a qui tam action on the ground that a non-lawyer cannot bring a qui tam action pro se).

1. The FCA Does Not Preempt State Ethical Rules

As a general matter, the "salutary provisions [of New York's ethical rules] have consistently been relied upon by the courts of this district and circuit in evaluating the ethical conduct of attorneys." Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 n. 12 (2d Cir.1975). Nothing in the False Claims Act evinces a clear legislative intent to preempt state statutes and rules that regulate an attorney's disclosure of client confidences. See See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449, 125 S.Ct. 1788, 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) ("In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest." (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (same). As one court recognized, "[w]hile the [FCA] permits any person ... to bring a qui tam suit, it does not authorize that person to violate state laws in the process." United States ex rel. Doe v. X. Corp., 862 F.Supp. 1502, 1507 (E.D.Va.1994) (emphasis supplied).

At the same time, we are mindful that the central purpose of the N.Y. Rules — to protect client confidences — can be "inconsistent with or antithetical to federal interests," Grievance Comm. for S.D.N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 646 (2d Cir.1995), which under the FCA, are to "`encourage private individuals who are aware of fraud being perpetrated against the [g]overnment to bring such information forward,'" U.S. ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 660, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986)). In such instances courts must interpret and apply the N.Y. Rules in a manner that "balances the varying federal interests at stake." Simels, 48 F.3d at 646. We conduct the following analysis with these principles in mind.

2. Bibi Violated Rule 1.9(c) by Disclosing Confidential Information Beyond What Was "Necessary" Within the Meaning of N.Y. Rule 1.6(b).

FLPA concedes that N.Y. Rule 1.9(c) governs Bibi's conduct in this case. See Appellant's Br. 18. As noted above, N.Y. Rule 1.9(c) provides that

N.Y. Rule 1.6(b)(2), in turn, authorizes a lawyer to "reveal or use confidential information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime...."

Accordingly, review of the District Court's determination that Bibi's participation in the qui tam action violated Rule 1.9(c) requires us to decide whether Bibi reasonably believed that (1) the defendants intended to commit a crime when FLPA filed this action in 2005, and (2) the disclosures were necessary to prevent the defendants from committing a crime.

a.

We agree with the District Court that "Bibi could have reasonably believed in 2005 that [d]efendants had the intention to commit a crime." Quest Diagnostics, 2011 WL 1330542, at *9 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at *10 ("[I]t is reasonable to infer that Bibi believed Quest intended to violate the AKS in 2005...."). The District Court made specific factual findings as to what Bibi knew about defendants' alleged violations of the AKS. See Quest Diagnostics, 2011 WL 1330542, at *9-10. Defendants do not argue that any finding made by the District Court in this regard was erroneous. Finding no error based on the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it rests on its conclusion that Bibi reasonably could have maintained such a belief.

b.

The second question is whether Bibi reasonably believed that his disclosures were necessary to prevent defendants from committing a crime. FLPA asserts that it was "necessary" — within the meaning of N.Y. Rule 1.6(b) — for Bibi to reveal the confidential information disclosed in this lawsuit because the terms of the FCA required Bibi to make "`written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses'" to the government. Appellant's Br. 33 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)). Thus, FLPA argues, "[u]nder elementary principles of the supremacy of federal law, the FCA preempts application of Rule 1.6...." Appellant's Br. 33-34. We disagree, in light of the balancing principles set forth in Part A.1, ante.

Rule 1.6(b)(2) implicitly accounts for the federal interests at stake in the FCA by permitting disclosure of information "necessary" to prevent the ongoing commission of a crime. As illustrated by this very case, Rule 1.6's prohibition on Bibi's disclosures could not have undermined the qui tam action in light of the alternative means, discussed below, of exposing the alleged kickback scheme. Because Rule 1.6 itself balances the interests at stake, it need not give way to section 3730(b)(2)'s requirement of full disclosure of material evidence.

Alternatively, FLPA contends that even if Rule 1.6(b) does not give way to section 3730, Bibi complied with its requirements by "tempering his disclosures" until his deposition, when he finally testified as to the details of his conversations with Whalen and revealed the existence of the Winston & Strawn opinion letter upon solicitation by Unilab. Appellant's Br. 34. FLPA argues further that the ongoing nature of the alleged crime necessitated the broad disclosures. Id. at 35.

The District Court concluded that "[e]vidence of the continuing crime in 2005 could be shown by evidence of Quest's pricing agreements with MCOs and IPAs in effect in 2005 and not, for example, through Bibi's disclosures [confidential information]." Quest Diagnostics, 2011 WL 1330542, at *10. Thus, the Court reasoned, the confidential information divulged by Bibi, dating back to 1996, went beyond what was reasonably necessary to prevent any alleged ongoing crime in 2005, when the suit was filed. See id. ("Further, FLPA has not articulated a persuasive reason why disclosure of confidences from the 1990s to March 2000 would be necessary to prevent the commission or continuation of a crime in 2005.").

We agree with the District Court that the confidential information Bibi revealed was greater than reasonably necessary to prevent any alleged ongoing fraudulent scheme in 2005. By FLPA's own admission, it was unnecessary for Bibi to participate in this qui tam action at all, much less to broadly disclose Unilab's confidential information. See Appellant's Br. 43 ("Baker and Michaelson each has ample relevant information to bring this case").16 FLPA could have brought the qui tam action based on the information that Baker and Michaelson possessed as former executives of Unilab, or, if necessary, Bibi could have made limited disclosures.17 Instead, Bibi chose to participate in the action and disclose protected client confidences, see App'x 900, in violation of N.Y. Rule 1.9(c).

Because we affirm the judgment of the District Court on the grounds that Bibi violated N.Y. Rule 1.9(c), we need not consider whether Bibi also violated N.Y. Rule 1.9(a) — the "side-switching" rule — by participating in this qui tam action.18

B. The District Court Did Not Err or "Abuse Its Discretion" in Dismissing the Complaint and Disqualifying FLPA and Its Counsel

Having affirmed the judgment of the District Court insofar as it concluded that Bibi violated N.Y. Rule 1.9(c), we must decide whether the District Court's remedy — dismissing the complaint and disqualifying FLPA, FLPA's counsel, and the individual relators from bringing this action or any subsequent action based on the same facts — was proper.

We review a district court's decision on remedies for ethical violations for "abuse of discretion." See W. T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir.1976) (remedy of disqualification will only be upset upon a showing of "abuse"). A district court has abused its discretion if it "(1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions." NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have long recognized "the power of trial judges to disqualify [attorneys] where necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversary process ..." — most commonly "where the attorney is at least potentially in a position to use privileged information concerning the other side through prior representation...." Bd. of Ed. of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal of a complaint prepared in reliance on privileged information may also be an appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Nat'l Prop. Analysts, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 510, 519 (S.D.N.Y.1993), aff'd without opinion, 60 F.3d 810 (2d Cir.1995) (disqualifying counsel and dismissing complaint prepared in reliance on improper disclosures by the opposing party's former counsel); Doe v. A Corp., 330 F.Supp. 1352, 1353 (S.D.N.Y.1971), aff'd sub nom., Hall v. A. Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissing complaint in a derivative action brought by a lawyer against a former client on the basis of confidential information obtained while representing that client, and disqualifying lawyer).

We are conscious that, notwithstanding any salutary effect on attorney ethics or the appearance of fairness, dismissal or disqualification for violations of ethical rules may impede the pursuit of meritorious litigation to the detriment of the justice system. See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 236 (2d Cir.1977) (affirming a district court's refusal to dismiss a complaint due to ethical violations on the ground that "we are loathe to countenance a remedy which will affect the rights of a plaintiff embarked on serious litigation"). Accordingly, courts must balance these competing concerns by limiting remedies for ethical violations to those necessary to avoid "taint[ing] the underlying trial." Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1246; see also Fund of Funds, 567 F.2d at 236-37 ("[W]e have sought to strike a delicate balance between the [litigant's] interest in representation by counsel of its choice and the need to maintain high ethical standards within the profession of law."); cf. Hull, 513 F.2d at 572 ("[A party's] right to counsel of her choice.... must yield ... to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of our judicial process.").

We have repeatedly cautioned that, "[w]hen dealing with ethical principles, we cannot paint with broad strokes." Fund of Funds, 567 F.2d at 227 (internal quotation marks, citations and alteration omitted). In evaluating the remedies ordered here, we note FLPA's unusual posture in this litigation by virtue of its status as relator. While FLPA stands to benefit from any recovery in this case, it brings this suit on behalf of the United States government. As such, it acts neither as the real party in interest nor in a representative capacity. In addition, we recognize the particularly strong federal interest underpinning qui tam litigation pursuant to the FCA.

1. Dismissal of the Complaint and Disqualification of FLPA

We first address the District Court's decision to dismiss the Complaint as to all defendants and disqualify FLPA and its individual relators. In ordering remedies for Bibi's violation of the N.Y. Rules, the District Court correctly recognized that "[n]ot all violations of the legal code of ethics require dismissal or disqualification of counsel," and that the relevant inquiry was the "possibility of prejudice at trial." Quest Diagnostics, 2011 WL 1330542, at *11 (internal quotation marks omitted). After considering lesser alternatives, the District Court concluded that because FLPA "pursued this litigation on the basis that Bibi could `spill his guts' and freely disclose Unilab's confidential information," it would be "virtually impossible to identify and distinguish each improper disclosure." Id. at *12. Furthermore, given the concessions by Baker and Michaelson that Bibi had revealed information about confidential communications with Whalen, id. at *5, "[a]llowing Baker and Michaelson to proceed with the suit would allow that taint to proceed into trial," id. at *12.

We do not conclude that the District Court erred or "abused its discretion" in finding that, in view of Bibi's unrestricted sharing of confidential information with the other individual relators, permitting FLPA or any of its individual relators to proceed with the suit would taint the trial proceedings and prejudice defendants. Moreover, FLPA is not the real party in interest here, and, as the District Court emphasized, its decision did not foreclose the government (or, for that matter, a different relator)19 from bringing suit. Accordingly, dismissal of the Complaint and disqualification of FLPA does not significantly impair the federal interests embodied in the FCA.

Alternatively, FLPA argues that it should be permitted to proceed against Quest, if not Unilab, because Bibi never owed any duty to Quest. Appellant's Br. 46. This argument ignores the fact that "when control of a corporation passes to new management [as a result of, inter alia, a merger], the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 85 L.Ed.2d 372 (1985). The District Court thus correctly held that "any obligation Bibi had to Unilab was transferred to Quest upon its purchase."20 Quest Diagnostics, 2011 WL 1330542, at *13. We hold that it was not error for the District Court to conclude that "simply dismissing Unilab from this action would not fully purge the taint associated with Bibi's unethical disclosures of Unilab confidences[,]" id.

2. Dismissal of FLPA's Counsel

We next consider whether the District Court abused its discretion by sua sponte disqualifying FLPA's counsel, Troutman Sanders and the Michael Law Group, on the basis that such dismissal was "necessary to protect [d]efendants from the use of their confidential information against them." Id.

We note at the outset that the ethical violations at issue here were committed by Bibi, a general partner of the client, FLPA, and not by counsel in this case. As such, the circumstances of this disqualification do not lend themselves to the "precise application of precedent." Fund of Funds, 567 F.2d at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have, however, previously found it necessary to dismiss counsel who had themselves committed no ethical violation, on the basis that "confidences ... could have been revealed [to them]" that would prejudice a party in litigation. Id. at 233 (dismissing co-counsel of a firm that was disqualified due to ethical conflicts because the conflicted firm had shared confidences with its co-counsel).

Here, the District Court concluded that, by virtue of the confidential information likely revealed to them, counsel for FLPA "are in a position to use [defendants' confidential information] to give present or subsequent clients an unfair, and unethical, advantage." Quest Diagnostics, 2011 WL 1330542, at *13; see also Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1246 (holding that disqualification may be warranted where the attorney is "potentially in a position to use privileged information concerning the other side"). Moreover, FLPA's disqualification, by virtue of the intimate collaboration with Bibi in the ethics violations, alleviates the concern that "[t]he sins of counsel should not be visited upon his client so as to vitiate the latter's cause of action."21 W.T. Grant, 531 F.2d at 677. In sum, the District Court's decision to disqualify FLPA's counsel was not based on any error of law or fact, and is "located within the range of permissible decisions." NML Capital, 680 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

To summarize:

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.